Alternative revision theories of truth (Q1815415)

In the theory of \textit{A. Gupta} and \textit{N. Belnap} [The revision theory of truth (1993; Zbl 0858.03010)] truth is characterized by its behavior in a hierarchy defined by transfinite induction on the ordinals. A crucial aspect of the account is the recursive clause at limit ordinals (the ``bootstrapper''). \textit{A. M. Yaqub} [in: The liar speaks the truth (Oxford University Press, 1993)] argues that, for this account, the behaviour of certain ungrounded sentences is anomalous, and suggests a different bootstrapper, which avoids the behaviour. In the present paper, it is shown that Yaqub's own account is subject to anomalies of the same kind. The paper also suggests a simpler bootstrapper which is not obviously subject to the same problems, though it stresses that problems of a similar kind cannot (yet) be ruled out. For a critique of this whole approach to truth, see \textit{G. Priest}: ``Unstable solutions to the liar paradox'' [in: S. J. Bartlett and P. Suber (eds.), Self-reference: Reflections on reflexivity (Martinus Nijhoff, 1987)].