Yes, Virginia, there really are paraconsistent logics (Q1818380)

Paraconsistent logics have aroused considerable debate [e.g., \textit{B. H. Slater}, ``Paraconsistent logics?'' J. Philos. Log. 24, No. 4, 451-454 (1995; Zbl 0830.03002)]. The present paper argues that whether or not the paraconsistent (dialethic) reading of these logics is defensible, the logics themselves (that is to say, consequence relations) are of considerable interest. Rather than interpreting the assignment of the designated value ``both true and false'' to a formula dialethically, we can regard it as an indication of ambiguity in the formula (which is true on one resolution of the ambiguity and false on another). Let \(L(\Gamma)\) be the set of all minimal sets of sentence letters such that treating those sentence letters as ambiguous allows us to construct a consistent image of \(\Gamma\). The consequence relation of Priest's paraconsistent logic LP [\textit{G. Priest}, In contradiction (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff) (1987; Zbl 0682.03002), ch. 5], \(\Gamma\vdash_{\text{LP}}\alpha\) iff \(\alpha\) is an \(L\)-preserving extension of every \(L\)-preserving extension of \(\Gamma\). If dialethism is defensible, then paraconsistent logics are required to express it; but even if it is not, these logics have an interest independently of the answer to this question.