Chores. (Q1864803)

In this paper are analysed situations where the provision of each of \(c\) public goods has to be voluntarily assumed by exactly one of \(n\) private agents in the absence of transfer schemes or binding contracts. The problem is modeled as a complete information, potentially infinite horizon game where \(n\) agents simultaneously wage \(c\) wars of attrition. Providing a public good commits an agent not to take on the provision of another public good for a fixed period. It is explored the strategic trade-offs that this commitment ability and the multiplicit of tasks provide. Subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) are characterized completely for games with two agents and two public goods. For games with two identical agents and \(c- 1\) identical public goods it is established that an equilibrium that yields a surplus-maximizing outcome always exists and there are proved sufficient conditions under which it is the unique equilibrium outcome. Under mild conditions, the surplus-maximizing SPE is the unique symmetric SPE.