Diamonds are a philosopher's best friends. The knowability paradox and modal epistemic relevance logic (Q1868338)
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English | Diamonds are a philosopher's best friends. The knowability paradox and modal epistemic relevance logic |
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Diamonds are a philosopher's best friends. The knowability paradox and modal epistemic relevance logic (English)
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27 April 2003
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For those who hold anti-realist positions on knowledge, it is plausible that \(A \supset \diamondsuit KA\). If \(K\) is a necessity operator (of the modal logic EMT) and \(\diamondsuit\) is S5 possibility, then it classically follows that \(A \supset KA\). The possibility diamond has disappeared. But it is not plausible that everything is known. The consequence does not follow intuitionistically, but the almost equally implausible \(\neg KA \supset\neg A\) does. It is shown that neither consequence follows using the relevance modal epistemic logic RN4, which contains a constructive negation which satisfies neither negation introduction nor modus tollens; and this logic would appeal to a constructivist anti-realist.
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constructive negation
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epistemic logic
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knowability paradox
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modal logic
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paraconsistent logic
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relevance logic
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