Silverman's game. A special class of two-person zero-sum games (Q1895540)

A Silverman game is a two-person zero-sum game \(\langle S_I, S_{II}, T, \nu\rangle\). The set \(S_I\) and \(S_{II}\) are sets of positive numbers, \(T\) is a number greater than 1 and \(\nu\) is a positive number. The rules of the game are simple: both players choose a number \(x\in S_I\) and \(y\in S_{II}\), respectively. The player with the larger number wins (payoff 1), if his number is less than \(T\) times larger. In the latter case his payoff is \(-\nu\). The book contains an almost complete survey of solutions of all kind of Silverman games and contains many results that cannot be found in the literature. After a short introduction the chapters 2, 3 and 4 give a complete set of solutions for Silverman games in which \(S_I\) and \(S_{II}\) are intervals. The chapters that follow study Silverman games with discrete strategy spaces. In the introduction of the book \textit{R. Selten} writes: `Admittedly, Silverman games do not seem to have a direct applied significance but, nevertheless, much can be learnt from their study', and `Finally, let me point out that Silverman games have the potential to become a fruitful area of experimental research'. Being so, this is almost all good that can be said about the book. Of course one can admire the tenacity of the authors to complete the manuscript but it is the question if the reader can learn much from the offered material. A new-comer in game theory will miss an introduction into the elements of zero-sum games and will study, if he can, at most one of the many cases; the researcher will not be interested in the problems solved, how elegant the solutions may be, but in principles that he can use for his own problems. In this book he will find little that will help him (maybe with exception of chapter 5 on dominance).