Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof (Q1906707)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 841678
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| English | Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 841678 |
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Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof (English)
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6 February 1996
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\textit{S. Barbera}, \textit{H. Sonnenschein}, and \textit{L. Zhou} [Econometrica 59, No. 3, 595-609 (1991; Zbl 0734.90006)] introduced a restriction on the domain of individual preferences for which there exist a class of strategy-proof social choice functions, which they called voting by committees. The author gives a generalization of this restriction and shows that the restricted domain one obtains is the maximal one where voting by committees is strategy-proof except for extreme cases.
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strategy-proof social choice functions
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voting by committees
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0.8538771271705627
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0.827812671661377
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0.824263334274292
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0.8194335699081421
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0.8182440996170044
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