On bringing it about (Q1908787)

I set out Segerberg's account of ``bringing it about'' and focus on one of the two special axioms for his action operator. Much of \textit{K. Segerberg}'s work since ``Bringing it about'' [ibid. 18, No. 4, 327-347 (1989; Zbl 0696.03005)], particularly in ``Accepting failure in dynamic logic'' [Proc. 9th Int. Congr. of Logic, Methodol. and Philos. Sci., Uppsala 1991, Stud. Logic Found. Math. 134, 327-349 (1994; Zbl 0838.03027)]\ and ``Action incompleteness'' [Stud. Log. 51, No. 3/4, 533-550 (1992; Zbl 0786.03004)], has been devoted to the question of strengthening the second axiom. As I shall explain, I believe the axiom is already too strong, and so it is more important to ask whether it can be maintained at all.