Three-valued derived logics for classical phase spaces (Q1910876)

A `derived logic' or `phase space logic' is apparently `derived from the underlying mathematical structure of the space of physical states of a given system'. Here two such systems are developed, both 3-valued but with different negation operators, based on different definitions of `proposition' and `connective', although both are defined in a standard topological space. `Open phase space logic' arises from identifying propositions with equivalence classes of sets with the same interior, and connectives with set operations among these sets. A measurement \(m\) is associated with an open set \(m\) in the space, and \(m\) verifies proposition \(P\) if \(m \subseteq P_i\) for all \(P_i \in P\). Verification thus generates a bivalent logic which is fully Boolean. However associated with the bivalent logic is a 3-valued system formed by distinguishing two different senses of `failing to be true'. These are based on a topological definition of `adherent points' in the boundary of any set \(P, \text{adh} (P)\). Where \(m\) does not verify \(P\), \(P\) will be false according to \(m\) if \(m \cap \text{adh} (P_i) = \emptyset\), and \(P\) will be indeterminate if \(m \cap \text{adh} (P_i) \neq \emptyset\). It is shown that such a `logic' is not truth-functional, since for example \(P\) may be indeterminate while \(\neg P\) is either false or indeterminate. A second 3-valued logic is then developed which is truth-functional, but this requires quite substantial modification of the definition of proposition and logical connective. Propositions are now equivalence classes of sets sharing not only an interior but also special boundary `recreant points' and connectives are similarly more complex. The resulting system is shown to be truth-functional. Both `derived logics' are then applied to two example physical systems and their differences noted. While this discussion is certainly interesting, as the authors point out in their final section, there are many questions left unanswered. In particular it is not easy at this stage to agree with their claim that `the logics presented here in some sense represent a synthesis of Reichenbach and von Neumann-Birkhoff'.