Referential opacity and epistemic logic (Q1941726)

The author considers the problem of referential opacity within epistemic and doxastic contexts, as it has been presented by W. V. Quine. He discusses Hintikka's and Lenzen's solutions to that issue and focuses on the role assigned, within such contexts, to the rule of existential generalization (EG), by both of those authors. Hintikka does not allow EG to be applied to possible objects, while Lenzen does, but for possibilist quantifiers (i.e., quantifiers whose range is the set of possible objects -- be they actual or otherwise). Lenzen's strategy involves an interpretation of existence as a predicate of individuals, a view that has raised important philosophical problems, as the author himself notes. In order to avoid use of that interpretation and keep at the same time an extended application of EG to possible objects, the author proposes two sorts of universal quantifiers: one for actual and another one for possible non-existent objects. His proposal would not seem to involve viewing existence as a predicate. The author's proposal, however, is not backed by an ample philosophical discussion.