The `natural' and the `formal' (Q1976398)

As we consider the status of claims like: For all statements \(p\), `\(\neg(p \&\neg p)\)' is true, we must consider what \(p\), and accoqrdingly \(\neg p\), range over. Are they statements of an empirical language, in which case the claim seems to be a significant empirical claim, or are they statements of a formal structure that stipulates what \(\neg p\) could be, given \(p\), in which case the claim seems to be logically true but trivial? A metaphysical view of logic will want to say both, that the formal structure is somehow inherently manifest in factual reasoning. This is the point of view the author rejects in favor of a more pragmatic approach. The author distinguishes two realms, RF, the realm of the formal, and RN, the realm of the natural. The former is the domain of logic and mathematics, the latter the domain of empirical inquiry. RF may provide a `prism' for viewing RN, but it is always an empirical question to what extent the structure of RN reflects the structure of RF. These distinctions may be applied to interpreting the significance of various results in the foundations of logic, such as Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems and Tarksi's Indefinability Theorem. Such results may now be regarded both as purely mathematical results and as descriptions of human reasoning, but these require significantly different perspectives on the question and must be carefully distinguished.