Reflexive-insensitive logics, the boxdot translation, and the modal logic of generic absoluteness (Q1982014)

As is well-known, it is established by Solovay, Goldblatt, Boolos, et al. that the modal interpretation of PA-provability is formalized by the GL-modality but its boxdot-version (or, reflexive closure, in other words) to mean the provability and truth is given by that of S4Grz, where the two systems do not enjoy any common consistent extension in normal modal logics. In a similar way, Hamkins and Löwe showed that the modal logic of forcing (absoluteness with respect to ZFC-provability) is S4.2, which then gives rise to a natural question to ask the modal logic to formalize the forcing absoluteness and truth. On the other hand, in order to discuss such notions as ``consistency'', ``essential truth'', ``unknown truth'', etc., Marcos, Steinsvolt et al. developed a reflexive-insensitive logic (RI-logic) which is a modal logic with a non-normal modality to formalize the persistence of given intentional property (captured by a normal modality). So, for each normal modal logic an RI-logic called its RI-counterpart can be introduced as the fragment according to the induced modality (ri-modality for short here) defined in terms of the given normal modality, which is also closely related to the boxdot-version naturally. In this paper, the authors first investigate the relationship among them, in particular, the so-called boxdot-conjecture proposed by \textit{R. French} and \textit{L. Humberstone} [Australas. J. Log. 7, 56--61 (2009; Zbl 1330.03044)] and confirmed by \textit{E. Jeřábek} [Math. Log. Q. 62, No. 6, 608--614 (2016; Zbl 1432.03032)] later. That is, they show a restricted but somewhat generalized version in its setting focusing on its semantical aspects particularly, which then makes clear the above mentioned relationship between boxdot- and ri-modalities. Then, the observations thus obtained are applied to the main question in answering that S4.2 itself is the version for forcing absoluteness and truth as well. Moreover, \textit{L. Esakia} and \textit{B. Löwe} [Stud. Log. 100, No. 1--2, 163--173 (2012; Zbl 1368.03038)] have shown recently that the persistent (non-modal) sentences for forcing absoluteness constitute exactly the intermediate propositional logic KC obtained by extending the intuitionistic with the Stone principle (or ``weak excluded middle'' axiom in other words), from which then follows by a Gödel-embedding of KC into S4.2 as well as Block-Esakia theorem that the RI-logic of forcing absoluteness persistency is the RI-counterpart of S4.2. It is concluded therefore that the modal logic of forcing should be better understood as the modal logic of generic absoluteness.