Idiosyncratic preferences in games on networks (Q2078031)

The author studies equilibria in simultaneous move, complete information binary action games of strategic complements and strategic substitutes, played on a fixed network. The novelty relative to most of the previous literature is that players have idiosyncratic preferences over the available actions. \textit{P. Hernández} et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 79, 56--66 (2013; Zbl 1281.91049)] and \textit{P. Hernández} et al. [Econ. Lett. 155, 154--156 (2017; Zbl 1395.91144)] have previously studied idiosyncratic preferences in specific games on networks where players have coordination or anti-coordination incentives. The analysis examines a broader class of games. It gives necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of different types of equilibrium.