On Lakatos's decomposition of the notion of proof (Q2080593)

In this paper the author first discusses the relationship between Popper's falsificationism with respect to science and Lakatos's fallibilism with respect to mathematics. He argues that the content of Popper's logical and epistemological papers of the late 1940s had considerable influence on Lakatos. Secondly the author turns to Lakatos' view on the development of mathematics in which the notion of concept-stretching plays a central role. The author concentrates on the consequences of Lakatos' move to stretch the concept of concept stretching. It leads Lakatos to the skeptical conclusion that no single language can model the growth of knowledge: ``If you want mathematics to be meaningful, you must resign of certainty. If you want certainty, get rid of meaning''. For the entire collection see [Zbl 1483.00027].