Majority-approval social choice (Q2165624)

This article studies the axiomatic construction of social choice rules. A rule called majority approval, which coincides with the simple majority rule when the latter contains no top cycles and otherwise coincides with approval voting defined on the top cycle set is proposed. It is derived together with versions of neutrality and positive responsiveness axioms. The first axiom prescribes the top cycle rule whenever approval information is unavailable. The second is a consistency axiom, which relates social choices with and without approval information and requires that whenever the social choices at two preference profiles coincide in the absence of approval information they should also coincide when coupled with the same approval information. Whenever a Condorcet winner is available, the rule selects it as the unique social choice. When there are only two options (and an odd number of agents), revealed preference information alone determines the social outcome. A version involving a Pareto top cycle rule satisfies the Pareto criterion. The proposed rule is compared with some other rules built prioritizing preference information over approval information.