The impact of interactive dependence on privacy protection behavior based on evolutionary game (Q2180666)

This paper studies the impact of interactive dependence on privacy protection behavior based on evolutionary game. The model considered features a privacy protection in a grid network with Von Neumann neighborhood with size 300 and periodic boundary. A node may adopt heterogeneous decision-making method, where they adopt different strategies for different neighbors. Each node can take the privacy protection or do not take the privacy protection toward each neighbor and then play the game with four directly connected neighbors and obtain the cumulative income following an income matrix. When both players do not adopt privacy protection strategy, they will not receive any benefits. A parameter is introduced to measure the cost-benefit ratio. Monte Carlo simulations have been performed to show the evolution of the game process. Let \(u\) be the dependence strength of player on the neighbor who interacts directly with the central node. It is shown that when \(u\) is 1, game between nodes completely depends on the behavior of interactive opponent and the system falls into a deadlock with constant strategies.