Beyond logical pluralism and logical monism (Q2183711)

The author reviews a number of ``kinds'' of logical pluralism by relying especially on \textit{M. Eklund}'s paper [``Making sense of logical pluralism'', Inquiry 63, No. 3--4, 433--454 (2020; \url{doi:10.1080/0020174X.2017.1321499})]. Towards the end of his article, the author briefly sketches what he calls a new ``view'' of logical pluralism that goes under the name of ``logical dynamism''. He claims that it is more plausible than the variants of pluralism he has reviewed as it ``steers clear from the major drawbacks of both logical monism and logical pluralism''. He also claims that logical dynamism ``accommodates all the varieties'' of logical pluralism mentioned by Eklund [loc. cit.].