Leibniz's syncategorematic infinitesimals. II: Their existence, their use and their role in the justification of the differential calculus (Q2201990)

One can begin with the authors' abstract: ``In this paper, we endeavour to give a historically accurate presentation of how Leibniz understood his infinitesimals, and how he justified their use. Some authors claim that when Leibniz called them ``fictions'' in response to the criticisms of the calculus by Rolle and others at the turn of the century, he had in mind a different meaning of ``fiction'' than in his earlier work, involving a commitment to their existence as non-Archimedean elements of the continuum. Against this, we show that by 1676 Leibniz had already developed an interpretation from which he never wavered, according to which infinitesimals, like infinite wholes, cannot be regarded as existing because their concepts entail contradictions, even though they may be used as if they exist under certain specified conditions -- a conception he later characterized as ``syncategorematic''. Thus, one cannot infer the \textit{existence} of infinitesimals from their successful use. By a detailed analysis of Leibniz's arguments in his \textit{De quadratura} of 1675--1676, we show that Leibniz had already presented there two strategies for presenting infinitesimalist methods, one in which one uses finite quantities that can be made as small as necessary in order for the error to be smaller than can be assigned, and thus zero; and another ``direct'' method in which the infinite and infinitely small are introduced by a fiction analogous to imaginary roots in algebra, and to points at infinity in projective geometry. We then show how in his mature papers the latter strategy, now articulated as based on the Law of Continuity, is presented to critics of the calculus as being equally constitutive for the foundations of algebra and geometry and also as being provably rigorous according to the accepted standards in keeping with the Archimedean axiom.'' This paper consists of the following sections: \begin{itemize} \item[1.] \textit{Introduction: a simple dichotomy?} \item[2.] \textit{Fictions and the existence of infinitesimals.} Here, the authors ``show how Leibniz never deviated from his view that infinitesimals do not in fact exist''. \item[3.] \textit{The DQA and the ``direct method''}. This section is devoted to the question ``how Leibniz's method in the DQA builds on and improves upon the extant method of indivisibles, and then set about exploring some of its subtleties''. Let us note that DQA is the treatise \textit{De quadratura arithmetica circuli ellipseos et hyperbolae}, where Leibniz mentions his interpretation in terms of fictions. \item[4.] \textit{The posterity of the DQA}. \item[5.] \textit{Leibniz's mature justifications of the use of infinitesimals}. \item[6.] \textit{The justifications of the differential algorithm}. \end{itemize} Finally, one can note the authors' conclusions: ``In this paper, we have shown that Leibniz had developed, already by 1676, an interpretation according to which infinitesimals, like infinite wholes, cannot be regarded as existing because their concepts entail contradictions. Accordingly, reference to the infinite and infinitely small does not amount to the acceptance of genuine infinite entities, but is a ``way of speaking'' referring ultimately to the only existing mathematical quantities, that is, finite quantities (satisfying the part-whole axiom). We have argued that Leibniz never wavered from this conception, which he later characterized as ``syncategorematic''. However, this does not prevent the use of infinitesimals as if they exist, under certain specified conditions. Thus, the question of existence must be distinguished from questions concerning use. In particular, one cannot infer the existence of infinitesimals from the success of methods based on using them. When it comes to the question of justification, we contend that in his De quadratura of 1675--1676 Leibniz had already presented two strategies for presenting infinitesimalist methods, one in which one uses finite quantities that can be made as small as necessary in order for the error to be smaller than can be assigned, and thus zero; and another ``direct'' method in which the infinite and infinitely small are introduced by a fiction analogous to imaginary roots in algebra, and to points at infinity in projective geometry. In his mature papers, the latter strategy, now articulated as based on the Law of Continuity, is presented to critics of the calculus as being equally constitutive for the foundations of ordinary algebra, but also as being provably rigorous according to the accepted standards in keeping with the Archimedean axiom.'' For Part I, see [the second author, ibid. 67, No. 5, 553--593 (2013; Zbl 1273.01021)].