Associated consistency characterization of two linear values for TU games by matrix approach (Q2261539)

In this work, cooperative games with transferable utility (for short, TU-games) are studied. Its objective is the axiomatic characterization of a solution by means of, among others, a property of consistency. In addition, the so-called matrix approach is used. The considered solution is the so-called equal allocation of non-separable contributions (EANS) value (cf. [\textit{H. Moulin}, J. Econ. Theory 36, 120--148 (1985; Zbl 0603.90013)]). This solution assigns to each player, firstly, the marginal contribution to the total coalition, that is, their separable contribution. Secondly, the EANS-value distributes among all agents, equally, the nonseparable contribution. Furthermore, it is also considered the Center of gravity of Imputation Set (CIS) value. This value was introduced in [\textit{T. S. H. Driessen} and \textit{Y. Funaki}, OR Spektrum 13, No. 1, 15--30 (1991; Zbl 0741.90100)], and it is the dual of the EANS-value, which allows a simple way to obtain the corresponding axiomatic characterization. Regarding to the used property of consistency, the followed approach is the called associated game. The idea is that in a given game, the value of each coalition can be recalculated in terms of a rule related to the initial game. The associated consistency states that the proposed solution gives the same payoff vector to the initial game and to the associated game. Note that this kind of consistency is different from the consistency that is based on the reduced games: those that arise after some players have left the game after being paid according to a certain value. Such consistency was introduced in [\textit{M. Davis} and \textit{M. Maschler}, Nav. Res. Logist. Q. 12, 223--259 (1965; Zbl 0204.20202)]. The concept of associated game appears in [\textit{G. Hamiache}, Int. J. Game Theory 30, No. 2, 279--289 (2001; Zbl 1082.91014)], and in that work it is proved that the well-known Shapley value satisfies the associated game consistency. Several authors studied the consistency of the Shapley value and other values using matrix analysis, such as [the first author et al., Linear Algebra Appl. 428, No. 7, 1571--1586 (2008; Zbl 1133.91006); \textit{G. Hamiache}, Int. Game Theory Rev. 12, No. 2, 175--187 (2010; Zbl 1203.91018); Soc. Choice Welfare 38, No. 1, 85--100 (2012; Zbl 1278.91016)], among others. The main result of this work states that the EANS-value is the unique value satisfying associated game consistency with respect to a certain associated game, joint with properties of continuity and inessential game property. Here, the associated game makes use of the nonseparable costs. This result is parallel to the characterization of the Shapley value by Hamiache [2001, loc. cit.] which makes use of associated game consistency with respect to a different associated game, continuity and inessential game property. Another characterization of the EANS-value is provided by \textit{Y.-A. Hwang} [Econ. Theory 28, No. 3, 709--719 (2006; Zbl 1107.91019)]. In this case, the properties used are associated game consistency with respect to a third type of associated game, continuity, efficiency, anonymity, and translation covariance. In this last case, due to the argument of the proof, it is not possible to use the inessential game property, that has to be replaced by other axioms. In the current paper, the axiomatic characterizations of the EANS-value and the CIS-value are proven using the matrix technique and the proofs make use of linear algebra.