Uncertain coalition structure game with payoff of belief structure (Q2287826)

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Uncertain coalition structure game with payoff of belief structure
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    Uncertain coalition structure game with payoff of belief structure (English)
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    21 January 2020
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    Cooperative game theory deals with coalitions who coordinate their actions and pool their winnings. Formally, a cooperative game in coalitional form is an ordered pair \(<N,v>\), where \(N=\left\{ 1,2,\ldots,n\right\}\) (the set of players) and \(v:2^{N}\rightarrow \mathbb{R}\) is a map, assigning to each coalition \(S\in 2^{N}\) a real number, such that \(v(\emptyset )=0\). Often, we also refer to such a game as a \textit{TU (transferable utility) game} [\textit{T. Driessen}, Cooperative games, solutions and applications. Dordrecht etc.: Kluwer Academic Publishers (1988; Zbl 0686.90043)]. In the paper of [\textit{X. Yu} et al., Appl. Math. Comput. 372, Article ID 125000, 13 p. (2020; Zbl 07154701)] the uncertain coalition structure game with payoff of belief structure (UCS game) is studied based on belief structures of D-S theory. This type of UCS games gives us the uncertainty by assigning the probability to the set composed of multiple risk situations. For the solution of UCS game, this UCS game is transferred into an interval-valued coalition structure game by the two-step method. As the value for the interval-valued UCS game, the uncertain Owen value is axiomatically characterized by Hukuhara difference. Because the uncertain Owen value does not exist, the \(\alpha\)-risk Owen value is proposed for the general UCS games. The \(\alpha\)-risk Owen value adopts a risk coefficient \(\alpha\) to represent the risk tolerance of players, which is more realistic than the uncertain Owen value. Also, the payoff value of UCS game is decreasing with the increasing of risk coefficient \(\alpha\), and the allocation value for the UCS game is also decreasing with the increasing of risk coefficient α. The players can choose their allocation scheme according to their risk tolerance. In my opinion this paper is enjoyable to read and truly an enrichment for the theory of cooperative interval games. The paper is organized in an attentive way. Purpose of the paper is given perfectly. All theoretical results and examples are explained evidently. Finally, the paper is very well motivated, structured, written; theory, methods and applications vary in an appropriate way. I fully recommend the paper for researchers and graduate students in the area.
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    belief structure
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    coalition structure
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    risk coefficient
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    Owen value
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