Concentrated trading and the survival of overconfident traders (Q2300515)

The article is a natural continuation of studies related to the important topics: Continuous auctions and insider trading; insider trading in the market with rational expected price; smooth trading with overconfidence and market power; can overconfidence survive the market test? Based on the two-period framework (see [\textit{A. R. Admati} and \textit{P. Pfleiderer}, ``A theory of intraday patterns: volume and price variability'', Rev. Financ. Stud. 1, No. 1, 3--40 (1998; \url{doi:10.1093/rfs/1.1.3})]) the authors present the result that an overconfident trader earns more than the rational one. The overconfident trader's trading is less worried by the market maker than the rational trader's trading, so the marginal liquidity cost set by the market maker is relatively low. In turn, this low liquidity cost attracts the discretionary liquidity trading, which effectively provides more camouflage for the overconfident insider's trading. In this way, the overconfident trader defeats the rational trader by profiting from the higher liquidity trading. The model is discussed precisely in Section 2. Section 3 solves the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium and gives the equilibrium analysis. The equilibrium results for the two periods are characterized by the Theorem 1. Finally, the authors gives some examples to illustrate the above results.