Functions and generality of logic. Reflections on Dedekind's and Frege's logicisms (Q2339802)

This book consists of three papers written by three different authors but, in contrast to many such cooperatives, this one provides a well established and unified proposal. This is secured not only by the unity of the subject but also (mostly) by the unity of the same point of view represented by all authors. The aim of the book is to shed some light onto the roots of logicism, especially in Frege's approach, but also in Dedekind's writings. The authors show that apparently similar formulations of some theses should be carefully analysed in the context of other ideas held by their authors if we want to understand all the subtleties of different standpoints. It is done by means of a rigorous examination of the original texts but one can find here also a thorough discussion with numerous contemporary interpretations. All authors briefly present their point of view in the introduction and then continue with a detailed analysis of some chosen aspects of Frege's logicism. The first chapter by H. Benis-Sinaceur is concerned with the extensive discussion of similarities and differences between Dedekind's and Frege's version of logicism. Although Dedekind is rather not mentioned as a father of logicism, one may find in his writings claims that arithmetic is a part of logic. Yet, it is shown that although some theses of both great mathematicians are alike yet their conception of logic was very different. In particular, Dedekind's `logic of mind' is just an arithmetic taken in structural terms. M. Panza focuses on the central notion of Frege's foundational program -- a notion of a function. His views are compared with the earlier foundational program of arithmetization of analysis, due to Lagrange. The author examines both the similarities and the differences between both accounts of functions. It is strongly argued that both Frege's and Lagrange's conception of a function should be treated in their historical context rather then explained in modern set-theoretical terms. Such a treatment helps to understand the rationale behind the shortcommings of their accounts. The last chapter, by G. Sandu, may be treated as a sequel to the important paper of \textit{J. Hintikka} and \textit{G. Sandu} [`` The skeleton in Frege's cupboard: the standard versus nonstandard distinction'', J. Philos. 89, 290--315 (1992)]. It is argued that Frege's notion of a function does not coincide with the standard set-theoretic notion of an arbitrary correspondence (the view represented by \textit{M. Dummett} in [Frege's philosophy of language. New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper \& Row (1973)]). Frege's notion is rather a special form of manifestation of Ramsey's notion of predicative function. Thus Frege's views are treated on a par with Russell's conception of a propositional function and opposed to Ramsey's notion of a propositional function in extension. This book is an example of excellent historical analysis of foundational questions. It is of particular interest for researchers in the philosophy of mathematics.