Contrary-to-duty reasoning: a categorical approach (Q2342801)

An example of the contrary-to-duty reasoning is given by Chisholm's paradox: 1. Paul ought not to steal. 2. It ought to be that if Paul does not steal, then he does not give back what was stolen. 3. If Paul steals, then he ought to give back what was stolen. 4. Paul steals. This presents an obligation that arises in a context where a previous obligation has been violated. Obviously, the kind of reasoning required for this argument is not easy to formalize or to analyze. The author presents several examples and discusses some proposals for its proof-theoretic analysis discussed in the literature. It is shown that the framework of categories may be put to good use in a somewhat natural fashion, capitalizing on \textit{F. W. Lawvere}'s original approach in [Functorial semantics of algebraic theories and some algebraic problems in the context of functorial semantics of algebraic theories. New York, NY: Columbia Univ. (PhD thesis) (1963)], now considered a classic. The author formulates the connection of categories and deductive systems, neatly pointing out parallels of those systems which are of interest in the present context, and constructions from monoidal categories, with or without a co-tensor. This line of reasoning, quite technical both from the logical and the categorical point of view, is used to formally consider some interpretation problems in various areas of deontic logics, and to demonstrate in which manner various incompatibilities may be tackled or even resolved in the context of categories. The paper offers an accessible survey of deontic logics and its interpretation in terms of category theory. It is well written, the proofs are transparent.