Further results on essential Nash equilibria in normal-form games (Q2346321)

The author discusses noncooperative \(n\)-person games in the classical normal-form \(G=(X_i,u_i)^{n}_{i=1}\), where for the player \(i\) \(X_i\) is his set of actions and \(u_i: X_1\times \dots \times X_n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\) is his payoff function. The sets \(X_i\) are considered to be compact metric spaces and \(u_i\) are considered to satisfy assumptions related to semicontinuity, continuity or quasicontinuity. Especially, the author focuses on \textit{essential games}, that is, games whose Nash equilibria are all \textit{essential} (they, by definition, ``change continuously'' with respect to game perturbations). In the main result of the paper, a new wide collection of games containing a special dense subset consisting of essential games is found. This result generalizes the recent ones of the author [J. Econ. Theory 145, No. 1, 421--431 (2010; Zbl 1202.91009)] and \textit{V. Scalzo} [Econ. Theory 54, No. 1, 27--44 (2013; Zbl 1304.91046)].