Ranking sets of interacting objects via semivalues (Q2355016)
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English | Ranking sets of interacting objects via semivalues |
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Ranking sets of interacting objects via semivalues (English)
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27 July 2015
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The authors discuss some special problem concerning orders in the set of all coalitions in a TU game, defined by a function \(v:2^N\rightarrow \mathbb{R}\) with \(v(\emptyset)=0\) (called also a game \(v\)), where \(N\) is a fixed finite set of players of cardinality \(n\). In particular, they analyze some relations of \textit{probabilistic values} and \textit{semivalues} of TU games with a \textit{total preorder} on the set \(2^N\) of all coalitions, defined as a linear order \(\preceq\) on \(2^N\) with the following additional property: for all \(i,j\in N\) and all \(S\subset N\setminus \{i,j\}\), \([ \{i\}\preceq \{j\} \Leftrightarrow S\cup \{i\} \preceq S\cup \{j\} ]\). This determines the set \(V(\preceq)\) of all games \(v\) consistent with total preorder \(\preceq\) on \(2^N\) in the sense that \(v(S)\geq v(T) \Leftrightarrow S\preceq T\) for all \(S,T\subset N\). A \textit{probabilistic value} \(\pi^p\) for the game \(v\) is considered here as an \(n\)-vector \(\pi^p(v) = (\pi^p_1(v),\dots,\pi^p_n(v))\) indexed by a set \(p=\{p^i(S): i\in N, S\subset N\setminus \{i\}\}\) of nonnegative numbers \(p^i(S)\) satisfying \(\sum_{S\subset N\setminus \{i\}}p^i(S)=1\) for each \(i\in N\), and defined by \(\pi^p_i(v):=\sum_{S\subset N\setminus \{i\}} p^i(S) [v(S\cup\{i\} -v(S)]\). When the numbers \(p^i(S)\) are independent of \(i\in N\) and are dependent only on cardinality \(s\) of \(S\), the probabilistic value becomes a semivalue of a TU game. The basic question discussed in the paper is whether a total preorder \(\preceq\) on \(2^N\) is \(\pi^p\)-\textit{aligned} for a given probabilistic value or semivalue \(\pi^p\), that is, whether the equivalence \([\{i\}\preceq \{j\} \Leftrightarrow \pi^p_i(v)\geq \pi^p_j(v)]\) holds for all \(i,j\in N\) and for each game \(v\in V(\preceq)\). The authors study this problem in various configurations. Among other things, necessary and sufficient conditions are given for a total preorder to be \(\pi^p\)-\textit{aligned} for different values \(\pi^p\).
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preference extensions
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coalition games
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probabilistic values
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semivalues
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