On the uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium in case of concave integrated price flexibility (Q2434633)

In the introduction of this paper and in its concluding remarks the authors compare carefully their conditions and results for the existence and semi-uniqueness of Cournot equilibria (in their considered case of a class of homogeneous Cournot oligopolies with convex cost functions and concave integrated price flexibility) with results given up to now. To get their new results they study so-called Nash-sums (the sum of the components of an equilibrium) and show under conditions that if there exist more than one equilibrium \(a, b,\dots\), then \(a=0\) is not an equilibrium (each of the \(n\) one-dimensional production sets has the form \(\mathbb R_+\) or \([0,m_i]\) with \(m_i > 0\)). With the help of this result, theorems are proven stating sufficient conditions for Nash-sums to be injective and to be constant. Chapter 4 contains the main result: a sufficient condition for the existence of at most one equilibrium (this is semi-uniqueness). Results for the existence of a unique equilibrium are added, also some remarks about detected errors in the literature and a self-contained appendix with proofs of facts, for example, of the type that sufficient conditions for strict concavity are fulfilled.