Beliefs in conditionals vs. conditional beliefs (Q2460295)

Leitgeb distinguishes between two sorts of mental states, namely: beliefs in conditionals and conditional beliefs. On the basis of (logical) theories of (rational) belief change, he shows that mental states corresponding to the former class are distinct from those of the latter class. Next, the author discusses different aspects of conditional beliefs. For example, he shows that they are not beliefs in a material implication, but that they can be described in terms of subjunctive conditionals (with ceterius-paribus clauses added). Also, with the idea of justifying his claim that conditional beliefs actually constitute beliefs, the author considers three necessary conditions for a mental state to qualify as a belief and shows that conditional beliefs do satisfy them. These conditions are that beliefs have an intentional content, a behaviour-determining function and an internal representational structure that includes representation of their contents. Since conditional beliefs are neither true nor false and have two propositional contents, the author considers a further condition, viz., uniqueness of content (i.e., that every belief has one and only one proposition as its content) and truth-aptness (i.e., that a belief is true if and only if its unique content is true) and argues that this condition is not essential for a mental state to constitute a belief. Now, even though conditional beliefs do not fulfill this latter condition, the author shows that conditional beliefs can be internalistically justified.