Evolution on non-expected utility preferences. (Q2467873)

Based on the well known limitations of the expected utility theory, the author considers the evolution of preferences by investigating the non-expected utility case: From the author's conclusions ``\dots The aim of this monograph was to study a setup with general, possibly nonexpected utility preferences and to investigate properties of evolutionary stable populations in such a framework. A major feature of our model is that existence of such a stable population is guaranteed for any finite number ofpure strategies available to the agents and an arbitrary fitness function. This is an important progress compared to most work in evolutionary game theory and on evolution of preferences. Moreover, we have shown that in the case of two pure strategies and generic fitness values a stable population must necessarily not include any type which has an expected utility representation. \dots Another important finding is that the strategy profiles chosen in stable populations need not coincide with Nash equilibria of the material game, i.e. the game with fitness maximizing players.'' Chapter 2 introduces the main model; in chapter 3 examples are considered and the rank dependent expected utility in discussed. Chapter 4 focuses on the case of two game strategies. In chapter 5 betweenness is required. Chapter 6 ``highlights the importance of a couple of assumptions made in the previous models''. Reading the book requires some mathematical background; numerical examples are given to illustrate the results.