A note on multi-issue bargaining with a finite set of alternatives (Q2491081)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5027256
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    A note on multi-issue bargaining with a finite set of alternatives
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5027256

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      A note on multi-issue bargaining with a finite set of alternatives (English)
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      26 May 2006
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      The author describes two bilateral multi-issue bargaining procedures with complete information for the players. In both procedures, when bargaining frictions are small enough, there exists a large multiplicity of equilibrium agreements, including ones with arbitrarily long delays. It is also shown that in the first procedure called issue-by-issue or restricted agenda bargaining, the stationary subgame perfect equilibria may support a large multiplicity of inefficient agreements. In the second procedure called unrestricted agenda bargaining, strictly controversial issues are not necessary in order to find multiplicity and delay in agreements.
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      recurrent procedures
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      complete information
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