Games, groups, and the global good (Q2518391)

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Games, groups, and the global good
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    Games, groups, and the global good (English)
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    16 January 2009
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    This book brings a diverse collection of sixteen papers (essays) about different aspects of the evolution of cooperation and their consequences for various groups. It consists of three parts: (I) The evolution of cooperation at the level of individuals, (II) Cooperation and repeated games, and (III) Cooperation and problems of the commons. The papers discuss such essential questions like how do groups form, how do institutions come into being, and when do moral norms and practices emerge? In particular, the concept of cooperation is examined at a higher level than that usually addressed by game theory, especially focusing on the formation of groups and the role of of social norms in maintaining their integrity, with positive and negative implications. Six papers form part I of the book. The first one is by S. A. Frank who discusses the biological history of evolution as an aspect of evolutionary dynamics in the context of the question: how has the tension between conflict and cooperation (between individuals and group) shaped the history of life? In the second paper, C. Taylor and M. A. Nowak discuss (basing on prisoner's dilemma) five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. Next S. Bowles and H. Gintis analyse repeated interaction models of cooperation in social dilemmas with groups or self-regarding individuals, and show that none of them adequately explains human cooperation. E. Maskin analyses what outcomes correspond to evolutionary stable strategies in two-player symmetric repeated games when players have positive probability of making a mistake. The fifth paper (by H. De Silva and K. Sigmunt) discusses the effects of added incentives in the evolutionary game dynamics of a public good game. In the last paper of part I, B. Skyrms studies a dynamic model of network formation to analyze paths to cooperation in stag hunt games and some versions of prisoner's dilemma. Part II of the book also contains six essays. In the first one J. C. Flack and D. C. Krakauer lay the groundwork for a hierarchical theory of the construction and evolution of moral systems. S. Levin discusses the need of extension of game theoretical concepts to address dynamic scales, including analysis of meta-games, in which evolved strategies are diffuse responses to collection of situations. Next D. S. Wilson and D. T. O'Brien analyse their research on cooperation and its consequences at a city-wide scale in Binghampton, New York, showing that integration process is highly relevant to everyday-life. D. D. P. Johnson gives the argument in his essay that belief in God may be adaptive because it helps people avoid social costs. The fifth essay (by J. E. Hare) is about moral motivation from the perspective of Kantian moral philosophy, and it looks at recent literature on the development of human sociality from within game theory. In the last essay of part II, K. A. Apiah argues that much of what is share in the organization of religions globally today is the evolutionary result of diffusion. The last part III consists of four papers, and addresses practical issues involving cooperation and problems of the commons: E. Ostrom on building trust to solve commons dilemmas; S. J. Brams and D. M. Kilgour on how democracy resolves conflict in difficult games; B. O'Neil on the duty to apologize as part of of a normative regime; and R. Sugden on team reasoning and market relationship. Here the suggestions are argued that democratic process can ``stabilize cooperative outcomes'' by given voters a clear choice between a cooperative outcome and the inferior consequences of falling to cooperate.
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    evolution of cooperation
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    cooperative behavior
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    repeated games
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    public good games
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    group formation
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    moral motivation
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    problems of the commons
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    moral systems
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    societies
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    religion
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    democracy
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