What does Ockham mean by `supposition'? (Q2560800)

I focus on William Ockham's general account in ``Summa Logicae I'', ch. 63, of what it is for a term to supposit for something in a proposition, and consider two interpretations of it. I first construe Ockham as offering the following nominal definition of 'supposition': (I) \(\underline Z\) supposits for \(\underline x\) in \(\underline p\), if and only if \(\underline Z\) is a term of \(\underline p\) and 'This is \(\underline A\)' (where 'this' indicates \(\underline x\)) is true, where general terms are substituted for '\(\underline A\)'; names of substitutions for '\(\underline A\)', for '\(\underline Z\)'; names of propositions for '\(\underline p\)'; and proper names for '\(\underline x\)'. After considering and exonerating the definition of two charges of circularity, I argue that (I) is inadequate both as a definition of suppositing-in-some-way-or-other for something or of any particular kind of supposition. It can be modified to yield an adequate definition of personal supposition by adding 'and \(\underline x\) is one of \(\underline Z\)'s significata' to the right hand side. An alternative interpretation is to take Ockham as giving his general account of supposition when he says it is being posited for something in a proposition. On this interpretation, less problematic definitions of material and simple supposition are available. But the notion of being posited for, which is at least as obscure as the notion of supposition, is left unanalysed. On the first interpretation, this is the analysis that (I) is taken to provide.