Models in cooperative game theory. Crisp, fuzzy, and multi-choice games. (Q2571102)

This small book (135 pages) can be very interesting for readers who want to study further generalizations of the classical topic on cooperative games. It investigates the classical cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games) and some game models in which the players have the possibility to cooperate partially, that is, fuzzy games and multichoice games. The book is written very clearly, being a rich review of the most essential notions and theorems (with proofs) in these topics. It is divided into three parts. Part I is devoted to the classical TU-games. It reminds the reader of such basic notions like the core, stable set, core cover, reasonable set and the Weber set, and discusses their properties. Also the Shapley value and the \(\tau\)-value are discussed. This part ends with basic characterizations of the totally ballanced games, convex games and clan games, and gives a wide description of their properties. Part II investigates cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions. Such games are some strong generalization of the cllasical TU-games and helpful for approaching sharing problems arising from economic situations where agents have the possiblity to cooperate with different participation leavels, varing from non-cooperation to full cooperation, and where the obtained reward depends on the levels of participation. This part examines all the notions and results described for TU-games in Part I in the context of fuzzy games. The last Part III considers the multichoice games. These games are an another generalization of TU-games, where each player has a finite number of activity levels to participate when cooperating with other players. And once more the notions and theorems from Part I are discussed here in the context of the multichoice games.