Nonsymmetric values under Hart-Mas-Colell consistency (Q2576651)

\textit{S. Hart} and \textit{A. Mas-Colell} [Econometrica 57, No. 3, 589--614 (1999; Zbl 0675.90103)] showed that the Shapley value of a game \(v\) is generated by a potential \(P_v\) of the game, a real-valued function on coalitions of \(v\) defined by \[ \sum_{i\in S} P_v(S)-P_v(S\setminus \{i\})=v(S), \] in the sense that the Shapley assignment \(f_i^{\text{Sh}}(N,v)\) to player \(i\) is just \(P_v(N)-P_v(N\setminus \{i\})\). If the players have nonlinear `utility' functions on the value space, evaluating assignment \(t\) as \(u_i(t)\), then one may say that a value \(f(N,v)\) is generated by a potential if \(u_i(f_i(N,v))=P_v(N)-P_v(N\setminus \{i\})\), instead of simply \(f_i(N,v)\); having accordingly to change the terms in the definition of the potential to \(u_i^{-1}(P_v(S)-P_v(S\setminus \{i\}))\), thus obtaining a potential \textit{with respect to the family} \(\{u_i\}\). Which values are generated by potentials with respect to some family \(\{u_i\}\)? This is the main question addressed in the paper under review. The answer she obtains is essentially all Hart--Mas-Colell consistent (including non-symmetric) values. The proof builds on a simpler property (than that of being generated by a potential) that the author shows to be enjoyed by consistent values, namely that of being equal sacrifice with respect to a family \(\{u_i\}\) for all two-person games: for all games \(\Gamma=(\{i,j\},v)\), \[ u_i(f_i(\Gamma))-u_i(v(\{i\})) =u_j(f_j(\Gamma))-u_j(v(\{j\})). \] In turn, the proof of the above fact is obtained from the analogous result (obtained by the same author in a previous paper) on a special class of games, the claim problems, where a certain sum is to be divided among \(N\) claimants. Within this class the analysis is easier because the concept of consistency is inherently simpler than for general games.