On Peirce's 1878 article `\textit{The probability of induction}': a conceptualistic appraisal (Q2659142)
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On Peirce's 1878 article `\textit{The probability of induction}': a conceptualistic appraisal (English)
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25 March 2021
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A consideration of the article \textit{The probability of induction} written by C. S. Peirce in 1878 seems quite in order to begin this brief note. In such an opus, the reader encounters the following paragraphs: ``We have found that every argument derives its force from the general truth of the class of inferences to which it belongs; and that probability is the proportion of arguments carrying truth with them among those of any genus. This is most conveniently expressed in the nomenclature of medieval logicians. They called the fact expressed by a premise an `antecedent', and that which follows from it its `consequent'; while the leading principle, that every (or almost every) such antecedent is followed by such a consequent, they termed the `consequence'. Using this language, we may say that probability belongs exclusively to consequences, and the probability of any consequence is the number of times in which antecedent and consequent both occur divided by the number of all the times in which the antecedent occurs.'' In the preface of [\textit{C. S. Peirce}, The essential writings. Reprint of the 1988 edition. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books (1998; Zbl 0947.01021)], Richard Robin says: ``There are three major interpretations that may be placed on the pragmatic method. In considering a practical consequence one might emphasize the antecedent or the consequent or the consequence, i.e., the relation between the two.'' Peirce envisaged this last relation in a general manner: ``Thus'' if A, then B ``does not refer to any particular A or B but prescribes a general relation between actions of the sort A and experiences of the sort B, which has held in the past, does hold now, and will held in the future. It expresses what Peirce called a `would-be', the experience that would be had if you acted in manner A'' [loc. cit., p. 18]. The author of the article under review works in such a context and deals with the problem of induction. Let us read, once more, Peirce: ``Taken in this sense it is incontestable that the chance of an event has an intimate connection with the degree of our belief in it. Belief is certainly more than a mere feeling; yet there is a feeling of believing, and this feeling does and ought to vary with the chance of the thing believed\dots\ Any quantity which varies with chance might, therefore, it would seem, serve as a thermometer for proper intensity of belief.'' Moreover ``the feeling of belief'' should be as ``the logarithm of chance'' and such a feeling corresponds to the ``balancing of reasons'' \(=\) arguments ``pro'' \(-\) arguments ``con''. The author shows, carefully, that Peirce's arguments are not sufficient to conclude on the impossibility of assigning probability for induction. He suggests that Peirce's thought on the probability of induction may have influenced statisticians and research scientists of the 20th century in shaping data analysis. By the way, Feller and Fisher are alluded to in a rather cursory way. It would be interesting to know the author's ideas on these ``would be'' scions.
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