Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections (Q2673214)

This paper studies voter models based on the premise that voters' decision is based on a motivation by the pursuit of common interests rather than private ones. In the approach it takes, voters seek to promote overall welfare rather than their idiosyncratic interests, but they disagree on which policy is the best. Thus the policies chosen are those supported by the largest number of thinkers, rather than those directly favoring the largest group of interests. This approach provides justification to polarization in candidates' positions instead of their attraction to the middle ground. A model for candidate utility combines office motivation with welfare motivation. Basing their behavior on imprecise voter signals, candidates can be quite extreme, potentially more extreme than any voter. In equilibrium, candidates who are more concerned with winning are less polarizing. Centrist platforms offer only a marginal electoral advantage. Because of this, in equilibrium, candidates continue to exhibit substantial polarization even when they have a strong desire to win.