Critical attacks in code-based cryptography (Q274541)

Summary: Code-based cryptographic schemes are promising candidates for post-quantum cryptography since they are fast, require only basic arithmetic, and have a well understood security. While there is strong evidence that cryptosystems like McEliece and Niederreiter are secure, they have certain weaknesses when used without semantic conversions. Critical attacks generally can't be avoided by increasing the key size of several code-based cryptosystems. In this paper we present a survey on critical attacks in code-based cryptography and we propose a specific conversion with a smaller redundancy of data than \textit{K. Kobara}'s et al. [IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 49, No. 12, 3160--3168 (2003; Zbl 1245.94077)] and which protects against CCA2. Our purpose is to evaluate three cryptosystems: McEliece, Niederreiter and HyMES. We analyse their security against several models such as: Broadcast, Known Partial plaintext, Message-resend, Related-message, Chosen ciphertext, Lunchtime, Reaction attack and Malleability. Our work follows a first work done by \textit{H. Imai} and \textit{K. Kobara} [PKC 2001, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 1992, 19--35 (2001; Zbl 0988.94021)] which does not cover the whole known attacks and does not deal with the HyMES scheme.