Gödel's unpublished papers on foundations of mathematics (Q2765288)

This is an extensive discussion of Vol. III of \textit{K. Gödel}'s ``Collected works'' containing unpublished essays and letters [Oxford UP, New York (1995; Zbl 0826.01038)]. The author chooses for his considerations a selection of topics concerned with the foundations and the philosophy of mathematics. Among the problems discussed are the ``Cumulative type theory'' (pp. 87-96) and ``Impredicativity'' (pp. 96-100). In section 3, Gödel's Platonism is treated extensively (pp. 100-108) on the base of a distinction between a weaker sense of Platonism supporting the view that terms in mathematical propositions denote objects \textit{sui generis}, and Platonism as mathematical realism (to which Gödel seems to subscribe) according to which mathematical objects are outside space and time, independent of the human mind and not created. Section 4 is devoted to ``Extensions of finitism'' (pp. 109-112) discussing Gödel's positions towards Hilbert's finitism, his negative attitude towards Brouwer's intuitionism and its formalization by Heyting, and Gödel's requirements for constructive formal systems. Gödel's so-called ``Dialectica-interpretation'' is the topic of section 5 (pp. 112-116). In the final section 6 on ``Modal logic/intuitionism'' (pp. 116-123), the author comes back to Gödel's negative view of intuitionistic logic, which is interpreted as resting ``on an overestimation of the scope of his interpretation of classical logic in intuitionistic logic using De Morgan equivalents (and double negating formulas)'' (p. 116). The author discusses at length Gödel's interpretation of intuitionistic propositional logic with the help of the necessity operator \(\mathcal B\) meaning `it is provable that'.