Silent-noisy duel with two kinds of weapon (Q2767808)

The paper is the next one in a long sequence of the author's papers devoted to games of timing of type duels. The considered model is of the form of a two-person zero-sum game with the following structure: Players I and II have one bullet each to be shot at a moment \(t\) in \([0, 1]\). Player I's bullet is silent, while the bullet of Player II is noisy. An increasing function \(P(t)\) describes the probability that a player hits his opponent when he fires at \(t\). It is also assumed that both the players are in possesion of another kind of weapon which can be used only at the end of the game at moment \(t=1\), when the the probability of hitting of the opponent by Players I and II equals 1. The author solves the duel and finds formulae on optimal strategies for the players and the value of the game.