Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property (Q283990)

This paper considers \(n\)-person games in the characteristic function form or transferable utility (abbreviated, TU-) games. In one of these games, a set of agents pursue a common benefit and each coalition can make a profit regardless of the remaining agents. An example is the execution of a project, so that the coalition building can generate savings for its members. There are different solutions in the literature for TU-games, that is, fair profit-sharing mechanisms among the involved agents. A well-known solution is defined by \textit{L. S. Shapley} [in: Contrib. Theory of Games, II, Ann. Math. Stud. No. 28, 307--317 (1953; Zbl 0050.14404)]. Other values proposed in the literature are the so-called equal split value and the solidarity value [\textit{A. S. Nowak} and the first author, Int. J. Game Theory 23, No. 1, 43--48 (1994; Zbl 0805.90125)], among others. Moreover, different axioms or properties for a valued solution can be considered, for example, null player property and consistency. Null player property establishes that those players whose marginal contributions are all equal to zero must receive a payment equal to zero. Classic null player property is far from favoring solidarity among agents. Regarding to the used property of consistency, the followed approach is based on the reduced games: those that arise after that some players have left the game after being paid according to a certain value. The property of consistency establishes that the payment that the proposed solution assigns to a coalition in the initial game is strongly related to what that coalition gets in the corresponding reduced game. The foundation of consistency used is introduced in [\textit{S. Hart} and \textit{A. Mas-Colell}, Econometrica 57, No. 3, 589--614 (1989; Zbl 0675.90103)]. In this work, new general versions of both properties, null player axiom and consistency, are presented. Regarding the results, first of all, they obtain a theorem that gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a value that verifies the natural properties of efficiency, linearity and symmetry (briefly, ESL-value) to verify the new version of the null player property. From here, new axiomatic characterizations of the equal split value, the solidarity value and a new value called per-capita value (a modification of the solidarity value) are obtained. The notion of consistency is also generalized, and it is obtained a theorem that gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an ESL-value to verify the new version of consistency property joint with a property named \(\lambda\)-standardness. Next, a new class of values is constructed that verify \(\lambda\)-standardness and the so-called probabilistic consistency. From here, new axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value, the equal split value, the solidarity value and the per-capita value are obtained, by means of both properties. These results complete and fortify those obtained in [\textit{T. Driessen} and the first author, in: ICM millennium lectures on games. Selected papers from the ICM satellite conference on game theory and applications, Qingdao, August 14--17, 2002. Berlin: Springer. 147--165 (2003; Zbl 1129.91303)].