Gödel's ontological proof and its variants (Q2856497)

The author's main goal is to analyze the formal (mathematical) aspects of the so-called Gödelian proof of God's existence. He first discusses Gödel's original version of the proof (as presented by Dana Scott). The system the proof is based on is constituted by (1) either an S5 second-order modal logic or an S5 two-sorted first-order modal logic, (2) axioms stating principles relating the concept of God to the notion of properties and essence, and (3) a full comprehension schema. One of the main problems with that system is that it collapses modalities, as shown in the paper itself. This problem historically led to modifications of the system. The author mentions several of such modifications, but he pays special attention to C. A. Anderson's modification, which differs from Gödel's system, mainly in the axioms relating godlikeness to properties, necessary existence and essence. The author shows that several axioms in Anderson's original system are redundant. He also explores three modal formal systems which are variants of Anderson's own system. These systems contain a constant predicate of actual existence and are based either on Adam's non-redundant axiom system or a modification thereof, together with modifications in some of Anderson's original definitions. Also, one of those formal systems is intended for fixed domain models and the other two for variable domains models. Necessary actual existence and uniqueness of a godlike being are proved in the three systems. Finally, the author analyses the criticism of Gödelian proofs by G. Oppy and briefly considers the meaning of such proofs for religion.NEWLINENEWLINEFor the entire collection see [Zbl 1253.00009].