Transient truths. An essay in the metaphysics of propositions (Q2895820)

This is a philosophical study concerning the status of propositions with respect to their time dependency. The tradition knows two main positions: (i) the eternalism which says that complete propositions have their truth values `eternally', which means that time (and space e.g.) moments they relate to have to be added or are somehow hidden but present, and (ii) the temporalism which says that the truth values of complete propositions might vary over time because of an intrinsic unrelatedness of those propositions to single, particular time moments.NEWLINENEWLINEThe author argues here for temporalism as an appropriate theory of propositions. She intends to prove that generally `time related' sentences form well determined propositions in such a temporalistic sense.NEWLINENEWLINEThere is, however, no structurally oriented discussion about suitable approaches toward temporalistic formal semantics for natural language understanding and processing. But the author shows some relatedness to Priorian temporal logic tools.