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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2134014
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    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2134014

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      15 February 2005
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      This volume is dedicated to Burton Dreben (1927--1999) who exercised a significant influence on American analytical philosophy in systematic respects, but also in reflecting nature and history of this movement. The book is closed with reminiscences by John Rawls especially on the time he and Dreben spent together in Harvard (\textit{J. Rawls}, ``Afterword: a reminiscence'', 417--430). The essays of this volume are meant to contribute to the growing historical consciousness in 20th century philosophy, but the editors are also interested in the interrelations between historical insights and philosophical practice. In respect to the standard view of recent history of philosophy they oppose the supposed distinction between the analytic and continental traditions. The editor's introduction (pp.\ 3--21) can be read as a short history of late 19th and 20th century analytical philosophy starting from the pre-Wars emergence of traditions with Frege's, Russell's and Moore's rejection of psychologism, Hegelian Idealism and historicism (pp.\ 4--5), via the golden age of Logical Positivism between the Wars to the time after the Second World War ``rethinking the future'' (p.\ 14). The three parts of the book map the periods just mentioned. The 20 essays are assigned to major incidents in this history from the publication of Frege's \textit{Begriffsschrift} in 1879 to the Sacks-Dreben debate in 1993. \textit{Warren Goldfarb} (``Frege's conception of logic'', 25--41) compares Frege's own views of what he had achieved in logic, with our understanding today. He argues for the thesis that Frege's conception of logic is integral part of his philosophy. \textit{Joan Weiner} (``Theory and elucidation: the end of the age of innocence'', 43--65) interprets Wittgenstein's claim that his propositions serve as elucidations in the sense that anyone who understands them will recognize them as non-sensical (\textit{Tractatus}, 6.54) with Frege's notion of elucidation, coming to the result that ``viewing Frege's and Wittgenstein's writings as elucidatory nonsense need not deprive them of value.'' They can be used to express something that cannot be expressed explicitly (p.\ 61). \textit{Dagfinn Føllesdal} (``Bolzano, Frege, and Husserl on reference and object'', 67--80) stresses Bolzano's and Husserl's influence on analytical philosophy. He takes up Husserl's notion of the intentional object, compares and contrasts it with Bolzano's and Frege's views on the reference of linguistic expressions. \textit{Jaakko Hintikka} (``Ernst Mach at the crossroads of twentieth-century philosophy'', 81--100) discusses Mach's influence on twentieth century philosophy, especially in his relations to neopositivism, Husserl and Wittgenstein. \textit{Thomas Ricketts} (``Truth and propositional unity in early Russell'', 101--121) treats Russell's adoption of a new theory of judgements around 1910, now understanding judgements as multiple, not binary relations. This indicates also a shift in his metaphysics from a metaphysics of propositions to a metaphysics of facts. \textit{Charles Parsons} (``Husserl and the linguistic turn'', 123--141) uses the case of Husserl to explore the gulf between analytical and the so-called continental philosophy, focussing on Husserlian themes that are relevant for analytical philosophy, such as the introduction of the noema and his theory of prediction. \textit{Juliet Floyd} (``Number and ascriptions of number in Wittgenstein's \textit{Tractatus}'', 145--191) places Wittgenstein's remarks on the nature of number in the \textit{Tractatus} within the context of the works of Frege and Russell and the development of analytical philosophy. \textit{Edward H. Minar} (``Heidegger's response to skepticism in \textit{Being and time}'', 193--213) argues that Heidegger's assertion that being is ``being-in-the-world'' can be regarded as key element in his response to scepticism about the external world. \textit{W.\ V. Quine} (``Confessions of a confirmed extensionalist'', 215--221) defines confirmed extensionalism. \textit{Michael Friedman} (``Tolerance and analyticity in Carnap's philosophy of mathematics'', 223--255) relates Carnap and his principle of tolerance to the different schools in the foundations of mathematics in his time. \textit{Peter Hylton} (```The defensible province of philosophy': Quine's 1934 lectures on Carnap'', 257--275) discusses the relation between Carnap and Quine, analyzing Quine's Harvard lecture on \textit{Die logische Syntax der Sprache}. \textit{Hilary Putnam} (``Hans Reichenbach: realist and verificationist'', 277--287) interprets Reichenbach's position in \textit{Experience and prediction} (1938) as a combination of material realism and week verifiabilism. \textit{Susan Neiman} (``Sure path of a science: Kant in the analytic tradition'', 291--313) discusses the role of Kant in analytic philosophy, facing the ``unexpected proliferation'' of Kant scholarship over the last decades and the fact that the distinction between philosophy and the history of philosophy has been questioned not least through B.\ Dreben's influence. \textit{Naomi Scheman} (``Non-negiotiable demands: metaphysics, politics, and the discourse of needs'', 315--337) presents metaphysical themes in recent analytical philosophy. \textit{Rohit Parikh} (``Language as social software'', 339--350) draws the connection between computer science and modern philosophy, surveying some relevant recent developments in computer science (program correctness, dynamic logic, temporal logic), then approaching contemporary philosophical puzzles (Quine's indeterminacy thesis, Searle's Chinese room puzzle, Wittgenstein-Kripke plus-quus puzzle) using analogies from computer science. \textit{Stanley Cavell} (``Silences noises voices'', 351--358) presents some ideas on Wittgenstein's \textit{Philosophical investigations} (1953). \textit{W.\ D. Hart} (``Long decimals'', 359--367) discusses philosophical implications of infinitesimals in nonstandard analysis. \textit{Sanford Shieh} (``Meaning, rigidity, and modality'', 369--392) gives a new philosophical reading of Kripke's \textit{Naming and necessity} (1970). \textit{Gary Hatfield} (``Epistemology and science in the image of modern philosophy: Rorty on Des\-cartes and Locke'', 393--413) criticizes Richard Rorty's rejection of the epistemologies of Des\-cartes and Locke, arguing that Rorty was misguided by not taking into account the historical contexts of Des\-cartes' and Locke's epistemological projects. In the last of the 20 essays, G.\ E. Sacks has the opportunity to argue for his position in the ``Sacks-Dreben slugfest'' (p.\ 420), a discussion at Boston University in 1993 on ``Fundamental notions of logic'', especially the demarcation between philosophy, logic, and mathematics (\textit{G.\ E. Sacks}, ``Formal losses'', 415--416). The book provides a fascinating tour d'horizon through history and topics of analytical philosophy. Although using an exemplary method, the discussion motivated by key events in the development of analytical philosophy by top philosophers working in these fields provides a very dense and multifaceted picture.
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