Leibniz's logic and the ``cube of opposition'' (Q346757)

The author relates Leibniz's logic, reconstructed as intensional algebra of concepts, to the traditional syllogistic theory of judgements as represented in the square of opposition. After reconsidering the traditional square and the corresponding theory, the author reconstructs Leibniz's intensional algebra as it can be found mainly in Leibniz's \textit{Generales inquisitiones} of 1686. One example for the differences is Leibniz's expression of the universal affirmative proposition ``Every S is P'' simply by ``S is P'' or ``S contains P''. Leibniz furthermore introduces a new operator of conceptual conjunction and proposes the unrestricted use of conceptual negation. The author reconstructs Leibniz's language \(L_1\), i.e., an extensional interpretation of the algebra of concepts. He arrives at a slightly modified form of the square of opposition in two variations (pp.\ 180--181). The author extensively discusses the validity of subalternation in \(L_1\) arriving at the conclusion ``Within the framework of Leibniz's `intensional' logic where the extension of a concept is interpreted as a set of \textit{possible} objects, the law of subalternation is valid, provided that this law -- or the entire square of opposition -- is \textit{restricted to self-consistent concepts}!'' (p.\ 183). In the next section, the author considers the quantification of the predicate as proposed by Leibniz in a fragment \textit{Mathesis rationis} of around 1700. The author can show that Leibniz's suggestions in respect to categorical forms are compatible with the standard square of predicate logic in the Fregean interpretation. But Leibniz also discusses four unorthodox propositions such as ``Every A is every B''. The author shows that these unorthodox propositions can be represented by an alternative square which can be intertwined with the former one to a cube of propositions. The author closes with a discussion of the meaning of Leibniz's unorthodox propositions.