On stationary equilibria of a single-controller stochastic game (Q3686594)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3908295
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| English | On stationary equilibria of a single-controller stochastic game |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3908295 |
Statements
On stationary equilibria of a single-controller stochastic game (English)
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1984
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two-person noncooperative undiscounted stochastic games
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stationary equilibrium points
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extreme and pseudo-extreme equilibrium strategies
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finite algorithms
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0.9621091
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0.95319223
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0.9256568
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0.91747665
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0.91604555
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0.9136702
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0.9097956
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0.90925634
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The author considers in this paper a class of two-person noncooperative undiscounted stochastic games in which one of the players (say, player 2) controls the transition probabilities, and the reward functions and the transition probabilities take values on the set of rational numbers. In this context it is shown that the set of stationary equilibrium points is the union of a finite number of sets such that every element of each of these sets can be constructed from a finite number of extreme equilibrium strategies for player 1 and a finite number of pseudo-extreme equilibrium strategies for player 2. It is further shown that these extreme and pseudo-extreme equilibrium strategies can be constructed using finite algorithms. The author also gives sufficient evidence that similar results can analogously be obtained for general-sum, discounted single- controller stochastic games.
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