On stationary equilibria of a single-controller stochastic game (Q3686594)

From MaRDI portal

!

This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use the normal view instead:

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3908295
Language Label Description Also known as
default for all languages
No label defined
    English
    On stationary equilibria of a single-controller stochastic game
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3908295

      Statements

      On stationary equilibria of a single-controller stochastic game (English)
      0 references
      1984
      0 references
      two-person noncooperative undiscounted stochastic games
      0 references
      stationary equilibrium points
      0 references
      extreme and pseudo-extreme equilibrium strategies
      0 references
      finite algorithms
      0 references
      0 references
      The author considers in this paper a class of two-person noncooperative undiscounted stochastic games in which one of the players (say, player 2) controls the transition probabilities, and the reward functions and the transition probabilities take values on the set of rational numbers. In this context it is shown that the set of stationary equilibrium points is the union of a finite number of sets such that every element of each of these sets can be constructed from a finite number of extreme equilibrium strategies for player 1 and a finite number of pseudo-extreme equilibrium strategies for player 2. It is further shown that these extreme and pseudo-extreme equilibrium strategies can be constructed using finite algorithms. The author also gives sufficient evidence that similar results can analogously be obtained for general-sum, discounted single- controller stochastic games.
      0 references

      Identifiers

      0 references
      0 references
      0 references
      0 references
      0 references
      0 references