Discrete logarithms in finite fields and their cryptographic significance (Q3726006)
From MaRDI portal
!
This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use the normal view instead:
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3956969
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| default for all languages | No label defined |
||
| English | Discrete logarithms in finite fields and their cryptographic significance |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3956969 |
Statements
1985
0 references
survey
0 references
public key cryptosystems
0 references
algorithms
0 references
cryptography
0 references
0.8916754722595215
0 references
0.8774626851081848
0 references
0.8741399645805359
0 references
0.8678070902824402
0 references
Discrete logarithms in finite fields and their cryptographic significance (English)
0 references
This article represents an extensive survey on computing discrete logarithms in finite fields and its relevance in cryptographic applications (mostly for public key cryptosystems). Given a primitive element \(g\) of a finite field \(\mathrm{GF}(q)\), the discrete logarithm of a nonzero element \(u\) in \(\mathrm{GF}(q)\) is the integer \(k\), \(1\leq k\leq q-1\), with \(u=g^k\). Several algorithms for computing discrete logarithms are known, most of which are discussed in this paper (e.g. the index-calculus algorithm, and, in particular, the algorithm of \textit{D. Coppersmith} [IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 30, 587--594 (1984; Zbl 0554.12013)]). An estimate of the running time of (modifications of) this algorithm is given for fields \(\mathrm{GF}(2^n)\) which might actually be used in cryptography. It turns out that the values for \(n\) have to be at least 1500 and carefully chosen so that fields \(\mathrm{GF}(p)\), \(p\) prime, appear to offer a higher level of security, at least for \(p>2^{500}\). [For the entire collection see Zbl 0578.00015.]
0 references