An Information Good Market with Symmetric Externalities (Q3735394)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3968261
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    An Information Good Market with Symmetric Externalities
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3968261

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      An Information Good Market with Symmetric Externalities (English)
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      1986
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      informational economics
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      diffusion of a concealable information
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      free replication
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      selling and buying information
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      multi-stage trading process
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      extensive form game
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      subgame perfect equilibrium
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      This paper studies a diffusion of a concealable information through trades among agents. Information has a property of free replication which is not provided with ordinal goods. Namely, once an agent obtains information, he can replicate it as many times as he wants at a very small cost. This possibility of free replication induces a possibility of resales and an irreversibility of trading in selling and buying information. Further, information in general has an external effect in a sense that a value of information decreases as the number of its possessors increases. We suppose a market of a concealable information consisting of one possessor and many demanders, and propose a multi-stage trading process among the traders based on the properties mentioned above. Representing this trading process by an extensive form game and employing the subgame perfect equilibrium as an equilibrium concept, we analyze how far the information is diffused and how much the initial possessor can gain by selling it.
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