Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-Linear Bargaining (Q3738844)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3972544
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    Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-Linear Bargaining
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3972544

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      Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-Linear Bargaining (English)
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      1985
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      quasi-linear bargaining
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      egalitarianism
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      utilitarianism
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      There are n individuals and a finite set of alternatives A. A social choice function is a function S associating with every sequence of utility functions \((u_ 1,...,u_ n)\) defined over A a vector \((x_ 1,...,x_ n)\) so that: 1) \(\sum x_ i=\max_{a\in A}\sum u_ i(a)\) holds for all \((u_ 1,...,u_ n)\) and 2) S is commutative w.r.t. permutations of the set of individuals. The author studies three classes of s.c. functions: egalitarian s.c. functions, utilitarian s.c. functions and functions referred to as ''equal sharing above a convex decision'' (the first two classes are included in the third one). The author gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an s.c. function to belong to a respective class. The conditions appearing are named as follows: ''No transfar paradox'', ''No advantageous reallocations'', ''No disposal of utility'', ''Dummy axiom'', ''Indifferences to merging and splitting''. The paper also contains some related results and a discussion of the literature.
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