Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-Linear Bargaining (Q3738844)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3972544
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| English | Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-Linear Bargaining |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3972544 |
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Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-Linear Bargaining (English)
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1985
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quasi-linear bargaining
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egalitarianism
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utilitarianism
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0.8532083630561829
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0.8172240257263184
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0.8052955269813538
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0.8026561737060547
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0.8026561737060547
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There are n individuals and a finite set of alternatives A. A social choice function is a function S associating with every sequence of utility functions \((u_ 1,...,u_ n)\) defined over A a vector \((x_ 1,...,x_ n)\) so that: 1) \(\sum x_ i=\max_{a\in A}\sum u_ i(a)\) holds for all \((u_ 1,...,u_ n)\) and 2) S is commutative w.r.t. permutations of the set of individuals. The author studies three classes of s.c. functions: egalitarian s.c. functions, utilitarian s.c. functions and functions referred to as ''equal sharing above a convex decision'' (the first two classes are included in the third one). The author gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an s.c. function to belong to a respective class. The conditions appearing are named as follows: ''No transfar paradox'', ''No advantageous reallocations'', ''No disposal of utility'', ''Dummy axiom'', ''Indifferences to merging and splitting''. The paper also contains some related results and a discussion of the literature.
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