Should Scoring Rules be “Effective”? (Q3747424)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3984229
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| English | Should Scoring Rules be “Effective”? |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3984229 |
Statements
Should Scoring Rules be “Effective”? (English)
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1985
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forecasting
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evaluation of forecasts
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proper scoring rules
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effectiveness of scoring rules
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0.8627338409423828
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0.8560687303543091
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0.8558813333511353
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0.8407097458839417
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0.8360710740089417
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A scoring rule is a reward function for eliciting or evaluating forecasts expressed as discrete or continuous probability distributions. A rule is strictly proper if it encourages the forecaster to state his true subjective probabilities, and effective if it is associated with a metric on the set of probability distributions. Recently, the property of effectiveness (which is stronger than strict properness) has been proposed as a desideratum for scoring rules for continuous forecasts, for reasons of ''monotonicity'' in keeping the forecaster close to his true probabilities, since in practice the forecast must be chosen from a low- dimensional set of ''admissible'' distributions. It is shown in this paper that what effectiveness implies, beyond strict properness, is not a monotonicity property but a transitivity property, which is difficult to justify behaviorally. The logarithmic scoring rule is shown to violate the transitivity property, and hence is not effective. The \(L_ 1\) and \(L_{\infty}\) metrics are shown to allow no effective scoring rules. Some potential difficulties in interpreting admissible forecasts are also discussed.
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