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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4012563
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4012563 |
Statements
1985
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R
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gamma
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material implication
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philosophy of logic
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relevant logics
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disjunctive syllogism
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E
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entailment
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relevance
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modality
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0.7838732600212097
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0.7830618619918823
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0.7771818041801453
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[For the entire collection see Zbl 0598.00008.] This paper is presented as a response to \textit{N. D. Belnap} jun. and \textit{J. M. Dunn} [``Entailment and the disjunctive syllogism'' in Contemporary Philosophy: A new survey, ed. G. Floistad and G. H. von Wright, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague) (1981)] on significant issues in the philosophy of logic. The paper is often (admittedly) polemical, but the issues are substantively addressed. Although the major claims of the paper are that 1) relevant logics do not reject the disjunctive syllogism, and 2) the logic E of \textit{A. R. Anderson} and \textit{N. D. Belnap} jun. [Entailment: the logic of relevance and necessity, Vol. 1 (1975; Zbl 0323.02030)] is not the system of entailment, many questions of broader logical significance are addressed. With respect to 1), the author claims that although disjunctive syllogism is not a theorem of any relevant logic, its rule form is admissible in certain theories, as was shown for instance in \textit{R. K. Meyer} and \textit{J. M. Dunn} [J. Symb. Logic 34, 460-474 (1969; Zbl 0274.02008)]. He concedes that the proof therein appeals to a metalogical use of the same rule, but argues that the circularity is not vicious. Others have maintained similar positions; see, for instance, \textit{R. Routley} [Relevantism and the problem as to when material detachment and the disjunctive syllogism argument can be correctly used (Research Paper No.12, Logic Group, Australian National University, Canberra) (1983)], [Canadian J. Philosophy (1982)] and \textit{C. Mortensen} [Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 24, 35-40 (1983; Zbl 0476.03005)] and [Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 27, 195-200 (1986; Zbl 0608.03001)]. The general debate is carried on also in \textit{A. R. Anderson} and \textit{N. D. Belnap} jun. cited above, \textit{J. P. Burgess} [Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 22, 97-104 (1981; Zbl 0438.03008)], [Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 24, 41-53 (1983; Zbl 0476.03006)], [Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 25, 217-223 (1984; Zbl 0569.03006)], \textit{S. Read} [Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 24, 473-481 (1983; Zbl 0569.03005)], \textit{R. Routley} et al. [Relevant logics and their rivals, Vol. 1 (1982; Zbl 0579.03011)] and \textit{R. K. Meyer} [Why I am not a relevantist (Research Paper No.1, Logic Group, Australian National University, Canberra) (1979)]. Along the way to 2), the author bids farewell to relevance, claiming that the theme of relevance of antecedent to consequent has outlined its (albeit non-negligible) usefulness. In the end it is motivationally circular: the required sense of relevance is precisely the relationship between the antecedent and consequent of a valid entailment. He does not condemn relevant logics in general, but claims what many other researchers in the field have also maintained, that it fares poorly by comparison to other relevant logics as a theory of implication which is considered to be the heart of the matter. What virtues it has have turned out to be shared by all the members of the relevant family. Aside from the formal ``roughness'' of E, particularly semantically, the author questions whether relevant logics require a theory of modality, and insists in any event that the one supplied by E is ``cumbersome and unpersuasive''. The more general themes discussed in this paper include the relation among theorems of logic, inferential principles and metalogical assertions; the nature of prescriptive formal reconstruction of good reasoning; and logic as a tool of reasoning with implications for the search for The One True Logic. Finally, this paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of the precise relationships between relevant logics and classical logic, a matter of increasing importance in light of \textit{R. K. Meyer} and \textit{R. Routley} [Studia Logica 32, 51-68 (1973; Zbl 0316.02029)], [Studia Logica 33, 183-194 (1974; Zbl 0316.02030)], \textit{R. K. Meyer} [J. Philos. Logic 3, 53-86 (1974; Zbl 0278.02025)], \textit{N. D. Belnap} jun. [J. Philos. Logic 11, 375-417 (1982; Zbl 0509.03008)] and \textit{S. Giambrone} and \textit{R. K. Meyer} [``Completeness and conservative extension results for some boolean relevant logics'', forthcoming].
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