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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4020804
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4020804 |
Statements
1985
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cooperative differential games
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renewable resource depletion
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common access fishery
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two countries
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equilibrium in open-loop controls
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extremal steady states
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phase diagram analysis
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bargaining
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0.84373539686203
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0.8315301537513733
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0.8223292231559753
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[For the entire collection see Zbl 0616.00006.] The paper deals with a common access fishery, exploited by two countries according to a mutual agreement. The resource dynamics are a standard extension of the Schaefer model and each country controls its own fishing effort, \(E_ i(t)\). Instantaneous utility derived from harvesting the resource is measured by a logarithmic function, \(\ln (E_ i(t)x(t))\), x(t) denoting the stock of resource. The concept of overtaking optimality is used in the case of an infinite horizon. After having determined an equilibrium in open-loop controls, the authors study the properties of extremal steady states (EES), i.e. convergence of candidate solutions to EES, optimality of such candidates and so forth. A phase diagram analysis in three dimensions is presented. Applying a bargaining scheme (e.g. Nash or Kalai-Smorodinsky) yields cooperative strategies as solution of the joint optimization problem of the two countries. The Pareto-optimal agreement can be obtained as an equilibrium if harvest rates, \(E_ i(t)x(t)\), are used as controls although the bargaining procedure has to be carried out using fishing efforts, \(E_ i(t)\), as controls.
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