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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4020804
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    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4020804

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      1985
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      cooperative differential games
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      renewable resource depletion
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      common access fishery
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      two countries
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      equilibrium in open-loop controls
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      extremal steady states
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      phase diagram analysis
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      bargaining
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      [For the entire collection see Zbl 0616.00006.] The paper deals with a common access fishery, exploited by two countries according to a mutual agreement. The resource dynamics are a standard extension of the Schaefer model and each country controls its own fishing effort, \(E_ i(t)\). Instantaneous utility derived from harvesting the resource is measured by a logarithmic function, \(\ln (E_ i(t)x(t))\), x(t) denoting the stock of resource. The concept of overtaking optimality is used in the case of an infinite horizon. After having determined an equilibrium in open-loop controls, the authors study the properties of extremal steady states (EES), i.e. convergence of candidate solutions to EES, optimality of such candidates and so forth. A phase diagram analysis in three dimensions is presented. Applying a bargaining scheme (e.g. Nash or Kalai-Smorodinsky) yields cooperative strategies as solution of the joint optimization problem of the two countries. The Pareto-optimal agreement can be obtained as an equilibrium if harvest rates, \(E_ i(t)x(t)\), are used as controls although the bargaining procedure has to be carried out using fishing efforts, \(E_ i(t)\), as controls.
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