Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets (Q3770253)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4029226
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| English | Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4029226 |
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Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets (English)
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1986
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oligopoly
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monopolistic competition
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perfectly competitive equilibria
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monopolistically competitive equilibria
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Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium market
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capacity constrained firms
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perfect competition
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0.9092796444892884
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0.8542820811271667
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0.8531147837638855
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0.8521625399589539
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The paper is concerned with the relationship between perfectly competitive equilibria and monopolistically competitive equilibria. The traditional approach here has been a Nash-Cournot framework where prices are set by a Walrasian auctioneer, and where firms choose production quantities taking as given the production decisions of other firms, and anticipating the impact of their own decisions on the prices chosen by the auctioneer. In the present paper the relationship between the two equilibria is studied in the framework of a Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium market for a simple good in which capacity constrained firms choose prices as strategies. Such a market always has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. The main contribution of the paper asserts that Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium prices and allocations converge (in distribution) to competitive prices and allocations, regardless of whether the underlying perfectly competitive limit economy or the limiting equilibrium is ``regular''. This result provides a justification for perfect competition that is based on an explicit account of price formation. A surprising result is that, independent of the number of firms, the Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria are such that some firm always charges (with positive probability) prices close to or above a revenue maximizing monopoly price.
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